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Abstract
A crucial problem of knowledge representation is that it has to be for-
mal and informal at the same time. Here, ‘formal’ refers to knowledge as
a mathematical concept which is thought, and ‘informal’ to knowledge as
something which is experienced, i.e. a ‘real’ world phenomenon. This paper
is an attempt to reconcile these potentially contradictory conditions. Our
aim is to show that a cognitively based formal representation may exist,
underlying traditional (formal) ontology, which may uniformly characterize
the different domains of human knowledge like logic, language, mathematics,
etc. We derive such a representation from the properties of cognition and
signification, and elaborate its application in propositional logic and (briefly)
in syntax.
1 Introduction
How could we attain that knowledge computed and represented automatically
were both correct, and meaningful in the obvious sense? Put differently, can we
define a knowledge representation which is formal and informal (i.e. natural)
at the same time? The first condition, imposed by the need for computer pro-
cessing of knowledge, requires that the representation is provably correct, in the
formal mathematical sense; the second condition, raised by the human utilization
of knowledge, demands that the representation is related to cognition. In this
paper we argue that these potentially contradicting conditions could be satisfied
by introducing a formal model for cognition as a process.
Formal representation is related to logic, amongst others, to propositional (or
Boolean) logic. But, is propositional logic a true representation of human cognition
from the logical point of view? We hold that although cognition as a process has
a logical meaning, the logical concepts involved in such process are more simple
than those of Boolean logic. What gives such simple, or ‘naive’ logic particular
importance is that, due to the primary nature of cognition, such logic may underlie
the different domains of human knowledge and function as a uniform representation
for knowledge.
2 The source of knowledge
In our view knowledge emerges from the observation of ‘real’ world phenomena.
Such phenomena are interactions, which are inherently related to change, and
which reveal themselves as events in our experience of change. Such an event
representation of an interaction is called an observation. In cognitive theory it is
commonly assumed that sensory observations (or perceptions) are triggered by a
change in the input stimulus. According to a theory of perception [4], the input
is categorized by the brain in complex entities called qualities or, alternatively,
qualia.
An example for an interaction, in visual perception, is the interaction between
input light (stimulus) and the receptors of the eye. A change is due to the dif-
ference between the preceding and current properties of the input, represented by
the sensory signal of the eye, potentially. A categorization is, for instance, the
detection of such a signal as an edge, which is a quality. But categorization may
characterize also the higher levels of information processing. According to [1], in
the processing of natural language, combinatory (e.g. syntactic) properties are
‘detected’ by the brain as symbols, for example.
The focus of this paper is not on the qualia themselves, but on the process of
their recognition as a sign. Our research has pointed out that a single type of such
process may exist, uniformly characterizing human knowledge representation, in
accordance with the economic nature of the brain as a (sign interpreting) organism.
2.1 The process of representation
We maintain that knowledge is a process of re-presentations. The initial step of
such a process is the recognition of the input qualities as primary signs, which can
be explained as follows.
The change brought about by an interaction triggers the senses which in turn
sample the input stimulus into a percept. The fact that there is a change entails
the existence of a previous percept. By comparing the current percept with the
previous one, the brain is able to distinguish between two sorts of qualities, which
are called, respectively, state qualities and effect qualities (or briefly, state and
effect).
State qualities are those that remain there throughout the transition from
the first to the second percept. An effect quality, on the other hand, is a quality
which, though it was not there before, is there now. The two types of qualities and,
ambiguously so, their sets, are denoted by a and b, respectively. The collection of
the a and b qualities is called the input.
Although the input qualities have two different representations as primary
signs, they are homogeneous (e.g. as bio-electric signals), which property makes
their comparison possible. In the next section we will show that, via the compar-
ison of signs, new signs can be recognized, revealing gradually more accurate and
clear approximations of the full richness of a sign of the observed phenomenon.
3 Perception
The meaning of an observation can be recognized in two phases. In the first,
which we call perception, the a and b qualities are individually recognized by
means of memory knowledge. In the second, which we ambiguously call cognition,
the relation between such individually recognized qualities is construed. In [6] we
argued that also higher level symbolic information processing may consist of such
processes. For example, in language recognition, analogous processes of perception
and cognition are known, respectively, as lexical and combinatory (e.g. syntactic)
analysis.
The input qualities separately and simultaneously trigger the memory, which
in turn generates a response. Such a response consists of stored state and effect
qualities, which are denoted by a’ and b’, respectively. By virtue of selective at-
tention, which is the brain’s potential for focusing on some of the input qualities
(observed qualities), and thereby not focusing on others (complementary quali-
ties), the memory response can signify the relation between input and memory
either in the sense of agreement (‘∗’) or possibility (‘+’). Accordingly, the indi-
vidual meaning of the input state and effect qualities, which are the final signs
of perception, can be represented by the expressions: (observed) a∗a’ resp. b∗b’,
and (complementary) a+a’ resp. b+b’. By interpreting ‘∗’ and ‘+’ as the logical
operations ‘and’ and ‘or’, we get the logical meaning of these signs.
Notice that a and b, but also a’ and b’ are signs, and that the event of triggering
the memory by the input is an interaction. Hence the above signs, representing
the relation between input and memory, can be said to arise via an interaction
between signs, or briefly, a sign interaction.
By virtue of selective attention, the signs conceived by the brain may represent
the input from some point of view, or aspect. The most general such aspect is the
logical one. Signs from the logical point of view are called logical signs.
4 Cognition
Cognition is concerned with the interpretation of the relation between the observed
qualities in the context of the complementary ones. This section is an attempt to
disclose the stages of such process. Notice that also perception can be defined as a
process, isomorphic to cognition [6]. Due to lack of space, this aspect of perception
cannot be discussed at length (in fact, section 3 contains the specification of the
first, and last stages of such a process only).
Cognition as a process begins with the classification of the four types of signs
recognized by perception. Again, this is a re-presentation, signifying the input
as an observed and complementary ‘thing’, respectively denoted by A=a∗a’ and
¬A=a+a’; and an observed and complementary ‘event’, respectively denoted by
B=b∗b’ and ¬B=b+b’.
From the logical point of view, the signs A and B, and ¬A and ¬B, are
variables, and their negations. The semiotic meaning of ‘¬’ is different from that
of the Boolean logical one, however. For example, A and ¬A both refer to qualities
that are perceived. Although these signs are interrelated, due to their shared input
qualities, they are independent, by virtue of their different memory qualities. In
traditional Boolean logic ¬(A)=¬A, allowing ¬A to be interpreted (semiotically)
as the sign of something which is ‘not present’ (hence not actually perceived).
4.1 Part and whole meaning
The relational meaning of the input qualities is determined stepwise (in this, and
later sections we will make use of the logical denotations of signs). First, the per-
ceived signs are interpreted as references to the input, respectively, as a collection
of parts (A+B), and a whole (A∗B).
A+B signifies the relation between the input qualities in the sense of possibility.
By ‘listing’ the perceived signs of the input, A+B refers to the input qualities as
a collection of parts (in accordance with the ‘or’ meaning of ‘+’), hence represents
the input as some ‘thing’. Because a part is similar to the collection of all parts,
A+B has the aspect of likeness. Let us mention that A+B signifies both A and
B as some ‘thing’.
A∗B represents the relation between the perceived signs in the sense of agree-
ment, as a simultaneous occurrence of the input state and effect qualities, and
signifies the input as an actual event that happens now.
4.2 Prototypical meaning
The re-presentation process proceeds with the comparison of the ‘part’ and ‘whole’
meanings of the input with each other, in the sense of relative difference. Again, as
a result we may get a better approximation of the meaning of the observation. Such
a more meaningful sign is the representation of the input qualities independent of
the specific ‘features’ of their actual appearance (from the relational point of view),
which is called the abstract, or prototypical meaning of the input. This can be
explained as follows.
A∗B contains the meaning of the relation between A and B in the sense of
agreement, and A+B in the sense of possibility. A+B has three different readings:
A, B, and both A and B (in short AB), which are synonymous, semiotically, as
signs of the input as a collection of parts. AB has the meaning of co-existence,
which is a degenerate case of simultaneity, signified by A∗B; the other way round,
A∗B includes, degenerately, the meaning of A, and B, as constituents, signified
by A+B.
By removing the co-occurrence meaning of A and B (signified by A∗B) from
the meaning of A+B, we may get the abstract, prototypical meaning of the input
qualities as some ‘thing’ (in the relational sense). Similarly, by removing the
constituent meaning of the input qualities (represented by A+B) from the meaning
of A∗B, the abstract meaning of the input as an ‘event’ may be recognized.
The two sign operations are different cases of relative difference, as it turns out
from the logical interpretation. Traditionally, relative difference (‘\’) is defined on
terms (as a whole), but in this paper we also introduce a version of this opera-
tion (‘/’) which directly applies to the variables of a term (as parts); for terms
consisting of a single variable, the two operations are each other’s reverse, e.g.
A\B = B/A. The derivation (including the definition of ‘/’): (A+B)\(A∗B)=
(A+B)∗¬(A∗B)= ¬A∗B+A∗¬B; (A+B)/(A∗B)= A/(A∗B), B/(A∗B) = A/A,
A/B, B/A, B/B= A\B, B\A= ¬A∗B, A∗¬B (a comma is used to indicate that
an operation has more than one result; such results are considered to be synony-
mous, semiotically).
¬A∗B and A∗¬B synonymously represent the abstract meaning of the input
as some ‘thing’, as a qualitative possibility, from the state’s, and event’s points of
view, respectively. The synonymous character of these signs is also recognized by
Boolean logic, in which, ¬A∗B and A∗¬B are commonly called inhibition.
¬A∗B+A∗¬B represents the input as an abstract ‘event’, by means of the
possible combinations of the abstract meanings of the input qualia as events, e.g. as
appearing properties (the reader should not be confused by the shared denotations
used by the prototypical ‘thing’ and ‘event’ signs). Such combination amounts to a
compatibility relation of abstract, prototypical concepts, representing the meaning
of the input in a law-like sense, as a rule.
4.3 Subject and predicate meaning
In the subsequent stage of sign recognition the actual meaning of the input qualia,
in the relational sense, is generated from the prototypical input concepts, by means
of the complementary qualities. Such qualities define the context of the observa-
tion. We argue that the context itself can be considered to be a phenomenon, com-
plementing the one which is in our focus. Also the complementary phenomenon
can be represented as parts (¬A+¬B), and a whole (¬A∗¬B), but, as the recogni-
tion process is primarily concerned with the observed qualities, the full relational
meaning of the context is beyond its scope. This ‘feature’ of sign recognition boils
down to the interpretation of the two signs of the context as synonyms, meaning
that its two views, as some ‘thing’ and ‘event’, are equivalent.
But the context has also a coordinating function. Although the complemen-
tary qualities are involved in the prototypical meanings of the input (in fact, their
abstract nature is due to those qualities), it is the context that signifies the re-
latedness between ¬A and ¬B. Therefore, the importance of the context lies in
its potential for coordinating the interpretations of the complementary qualities,
and selecting those of their possible meanings that are compatible, both as parts
(¬A+¬B), and as a whole (¬A∗¬B).
The prototypical meaning of the input can be brought into relation with the
context via comparison (which is a sign interaction) interpreted as complementa-
tion. Because the prototypical meaning of the input latently contains its actual
meaning as a possibility, complementation by the context can be alternatively seen
as negation (emphasizing the actual, and supressing the general meaning).
In the logical interpretation of signs, the context is known as the Shaffer and
Peirce functions, and (logical) negation as the DeMorgan rules. Complementation
by the context, of the prototypical ‘thing’ meanings of the input can be formally
defined: ¬(A∗¬B), ¬(¬A∗B)= ¬A+B, A+¬B. In the logical interpretation,
negation is with respect to the input as a whole. The two signs, ¬A+B and A+¬B,
refer to the actually existing instance of the prototypical input meaning (called
the subject of the observation), synonymously representing it as some ‘thing’, from
the state’s, and the effect’s points of view.
Complementation by the context, of the rule-like ‘event’ meaning of the input
yields a characteristic property, called the predicate of the observation, represent-
ing the input as a combination (in the sense of possibility) of the observed and
complementary events. Formally: ¬(A∗¬B+¬A∗B)= A∗B+¬A∗¬B. Because an
appearing property can be characteristic, only if the underlying general property
has been agreed to be significant, predicate signs have the aspect of an arbitrary
consensus. Finally, by virtue of the context’s potential for defining the subject
and predicate via complementation, and accordingly, functioning as the cause for
the actual meaning of the input qualities, context signs can be said to have the
aspect of causality.
The relation between the subject and predicate can be recognized via compari-
son interpreted as predication, as follows. Both signs arise from perceived qualities,
via complementation. What enables the subject and predicate to interact, is due
to their shared qualities (cf. common term). The identification of such qualities,
and the application of the predicate to the subject, and finally, the recognition
of the input as some ‘thing and event’, is the essence of predication as a sign
interaction. This meaning is represented (logically) by the proposition: A is B,
postulating the relation between A and B as a hypothesis.
In the formal derivation below we make use of  Lukasiewicz’s conception of a
syllogism, according to which a premise can be equivalently represented by an
implication (quantifiers are omitted). The major and minor premises are, respec-
tively, A∗B+¬A∗¬B (or equivalently, A+B→A∗B) and A→B (or equivalently,
A→A+B), from which A is B syllogistically follows (notice that by taking A←B
as minor premise, we may get B is A; the two propositions can be interpreted as
synonymous representations of the meaning of the observation, respectively, from
the state’s and event’s points of view).
4.3.1 Classification of logical signs
Our classification of signs from the logical point of view is depicted in fig. 1. A
sign interaction is indicated in the left-hand side diagram by a horizontal line.
The order relation induced by the sign interactions is such that the class of a
constituent sign of an interaction precedes the class of the interpreting sign of the
interaction. Notice, in fig. 1, on the right-hand side, the presence of all Boolean
functions on two variables (0 and 1 can be defined, respectively, as ‘no input’ and
‘input exists’). The fact that all such functions are represented implies a kind
of completeness: sign recognition involves the analysis of a phenomenon from all
possible aspects.
The operations underlying the interpretations of the different sign interactions
are: sorting, abstraction, complementation and predication (in a sorting sign in-
teraction the relational meanings of the observed input qualities, as parts, and a
whole, are ‘separated’ from each other).
Fig. 1 is also an illustration of sign recognition as a process, that we call the
innate or ‘naive’ logic of the brain. The types of sign interactions correspond to
(naive) logical operations: sorting, which is a single operation having two rep-
resentations, corresponds to ‘or’ and ‘and’; abstraction and complementation to
relative difference, with respect to the interacting other sign, and the input as a
whole, respectively. Although predication, generating the final proposition sign of
the observation, is beyond the scope of Boolean logic, predication followed by a
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Figure 1: The logical characterization of signs
degenerate representation of the sign recognized corresponds to bracketing (of a
logical expression).
The concepts of Boolean logic differ from those of ‘naive’ logic in three as-
pects. First is the uniform representation of the different types of qualities, state
and effect, as logical variables. Second is the interpretation of complementation
as negation (also the relation between observed and complementary qualities is
one of a complementation). Third is the non-synonymous interpretation of cog-
nitively synonymous signs, for example, A∗¬B and ¬A∗B. These generalization
and specialization properties characterizing Boolean logic have contributed to its
exceptional computational potential as an algebra, but potentially also to the para-
doxes and inconsistencies with respect to the meaning of logical signs which are the
result of a computation. Such problems may arise, for example, as a consequence
of merging signs (variables) referring to observations that are independent.
5 Conclusion
Our specification of signs, in particular, of logical signs as a knowledge represen-
tation is formal and informal at the same time, as it is related to cognition, but
also to the mathematical theory of propositional logic. But sign recognition as a
process would not be interesting were it not the basis for many types of knowl-
edge representation like natural language (including morphological and syntactic
symbols), ‘naive’ mathematics, and reasoning (including syllogistic logic). This
relationship has been the subject of research as presented in [6], [7]. With respect
to language, an overview of syntactic concepts interpreted as signs is depicted
in fig. 2. From the syntactic point of view, a complementation sign interaction
amounts to modification (e.g. of a noun), and syntactical complementation (e.g.
of a verb). This relationship shows that in the semiotic model of syntactic signs
the concepts of a ‘modifier’ and ‘complement’ can amalgamate.
The distinctions involved in the concepts of ‘naive’ logic have been recognized
also in philosophy, in particular, by C.S. Peirce’s [5], [2] (we admit that our research
has been strongly motivated by Peirce’s ideas). In his semiotic theory, Peirce
introduced a classification of signs and aspects (cf. fig. 3) which can be shown
to be isomorphic and analogous to the classification presented in this paper [3].
Insofar philosophy is concerned with the ‘real’ world as a whole, the close relation
of our work with Peirce’s theory makes the conjecture with respect to the existence
word
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Figure 3: Peirce’s classification of signs and aspects
of a single type of process for knowledge representation by the brain more plausible.
The classification of the types of signs, in particular, of logical signs, amounts
to a (logical) ontology of the ‘real’ world. Because signs are related to cognition,
hence also to ontologies, and ‘naive’ logic underlies Boolean logic, which is an
important angle of traditional ontologies, we finally conclude that the new world-
ontology proposed in this paper is in fact the old one.
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